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Abstract
To mitigate climate change, states must make significant investments into energy and other related
sectors. To solve this problem, scholars emphasize the importance of leveraging private capital. If
states create institutional mechanisms that promote private investment, they can reduce the fiscal cost of
carbon abatement. We examine the ability of different international institutional designs to leverage pri-
vate capital in the context of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Empirically,
we analyze private capital investment in 3,749 climate mitigation projects under the CDM, 2003-2011.
Since the CDM allows both bilateral and unilateral implementation, we can compare the two modes of
contracting within one context. Our model analyzes equilibrium private investment in climate mitiga-
tion. When the cost of mitigation is high, unilateral project implementation in one host country, without
foreign collaboration, draws more investment than bilateral contracting, whereby foreign investors par-
ticipate in the project.
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1 Introduction
States often face resource constraints in supplying global public goods (Barrett, 2007). As one promising
response to resource scarcity, scholars and policymakers have increasingly emphasized the importance of
leveraging private capital (Kaul, 2006; Brinkman, 2009; Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010; Rosendal and An-
dresen, 2011).1 In the case of climate mitigation, private capital investment can facilitate the decarbonization
of the energy infrastructure especially in rapidly emerging countries. When states provide public funding
for climate mitigation, they may create profitable investment opportunities for the private sector. To increase
private investment in wind turbines, for example, states could offer a subsidy to wind electricity generators.
This would produce climate mitigation at a lower cost than without private investment, increasing investors’
willingness to act.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provides revenues from sales of
emission credits generated by mitigation projects in developing countries (Streck and Lin, 2008; MacKenzie,
Ohndorf, and Palmer, 2012). Industrialized countries with Kyoto Protocol commitments have bought carbon
credits from projects implemented in the developing countries, and this has increased the profitability of
climate mitigation in the global South. However, leveraging private capital through public subsidies also
presents challenges. Not only do investors demand a return for their efforts, they also worry about political
and other risks associated with project implementation (Henisz, 2002; Büthe and Milner, 2008; MacKenzie,
Ohndorf, and Palmer, 2012). This article examines what kinds of public-private partnerships can attract
large amounts of capital from private investors under the CDM.2
We begin by developing a simple decision-theoretic model of capital investment. In the model, capital
markets consider allocating capital to a project that would mitigate climate change in exchange for carbon
credits. The capital markets are assumed to be private, so that investors focus on maximizing their net prof-
its. Our main conceptual innovation is to distinguish between two types of contracting on climate mitigation.
Unilateral implementation refers to the possibility that a for-profit project developer in a given country im-
plements a project and then sells carbon credits from the project on global markets (Michaelowa, 2007).
1By “private capital,” we refer to investments by corporations. This definition also includes companies with some state owner-
ship.
2To be sure, leveraging private capital may not itself be a good empirical indicator of efficiency. Under profit maximization, a
lot of private capital could be allocated to CDM projects that would have been implemented even without the CDM.
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The CDM now allows investors to acquire carbon credits from climate mitigation projects in the developing
world. Alternatively, bilateral contracting refers to the possibility that the project developer directly co-
operates with interested foreign investors on carbon abatement. This is also possible under the CDM. The
key difference between these two types is the role of foreign investors. In unilateral implementation, they
pay for them indirectly through markets. In bilateral contracting, they participate directly during project
implementation.
The central advantage of bilateral contracting is that foreign governments can provide technical assis-
tance and supply additional funding. However, bilateral contracting carries greater political risk. In bilateral
contracts, foreign investors may face discrimination, and they have less information about local conditions
than does the hosting project developer. Therefore, problems of credible commitment and asymmetric in-
formation are present. Our decision-theoretic model shows that bilateral contracting should suffer when
the marginal cost of carbon abatement is high. Given high project costs per ton of carbon, the developer’s
informational advantage is pronounced because even small information advantages can prove decisive for
profitability. Thus, bilateral contracts should only leverage additional foreign capital when the cost of cli-
mate mitigation is relatively low.
We then examine a dataset of 3,749 CDM projects from 2003 to 2011. In the CDM, domestic project
developers can implement carbon abatement projects to secure carbon credits that can be sold to indus-
trialized countries with Kyoto emissions reductions commitments. For example, an Indian energy utility
could invest in wind power instead of less costly coal, and the CDM would allow it to sell carbon credits
to Japan worth the difference in emissions that the investment made. The CDM allows both unilateral and
bilateral implementation (Michaelowa, 2007; MacKenzie, Ohndorf, and Palmer, 2012). For example, the
Indian utility could partner with an American bank to cover the fixed capital costs of the wind investment,
and the American bank would then receive some of the carbon credits. Alternatively, the Indian utility could
collaborate with a European wind turbine manufacturer. For industrialized countries, the CDM reduces the
cost of climate mitigation, which in turn promotes the supply of climate mitigation.
The data have two unique features that allow us to implement a detailed test of our theory. First, the
dataset indicates how much capital was leveraged relative to the amount of carbon abatement expected.
Second, the dataset distinguishes between unilateral implementation by project developers and bilateral
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contracting between project developers and investors from industrialized countries who have incentives
to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. We find robust statistical evidence for our theory. Unilateral
implementation draws much more private capital than bilateral contracting when the marginal cost of climate
mitigation is high, but the difference between unilateral implementation and bilateral contracting disappears
when climate mitigation is inexpensive.
If states are to draw private capital into climate mitigation, they should design international institutions
that emphasize unilateral implementation when the expected cost of carbon abatement is relatively high. In
such circumstances, bilateral contracting does not significantly increase the availability of private capital
through foreign investment. It is only when carbon abatement is cheap that states should invest heavily in
institutions that minimize the transaction costs of bilateral contracting. While bilateral contracting cannot
solve the most difficult problems impeding climate mitigation, it can meaningfully improve carbon abate-
ment in more conducive circumstances. Although private capital is not an end itself, it can expand the scale
and scope of climate mitigation activities under carbon markets. The more readily private investors allocate
capital to carbon abatement projects under the CDM, the higher the share of these cost-effective mitiga-
tion efforts in the global total is. This benefits industrialized states in the form of cost-effectiveness and
developing countries in the form of investment and revenue from carbon credits.
In the case of the CDM, the benefits of foreign investment, such as technology transfer and foreign
expertise, could be notable if the marginal abatement costs of possible projects in the horizon remain suf-
ficiently low. This is important because it offers a rationale for implementing the CDM, despite difficulties
associated with evaluating the additionality of carbon abatement and the possibility that CDM projects in
host countries ultimately discourage developing countries from adopting commitments because the “low
hanging fruit” has already been consumed (Castro, 2012). In the concluding section, the policy implications
of the findings for the CDM are discussed in greater detail.
More generally, the article contributes to the study of relationships between public and private actors in
international relations. In recent years, scholars have increasingly emphasized the role of private actors, such
as international investors and multinational businesses (Sell, 2003; Jensen, 2003; Bernhagen and Mitchell,
2010; Büthe and Mattli, 2011). Exploring the relationship between institutional design (Abbott and Snidal,
1998; Barrett, 2003; Binder and Neumayer, 2005) and the possibility of leveraging private capital for climate
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mitigation (MacKenzie, Ohndorf, and Palmer, 2012), we offer theoretical and empirical contributions to this
body of literature.
2 Leveraging Private Capital for Climate Mitigation
Recently, debates concerning climate mitigation and global problems more generally have emphasized the
importance of the private sector (Kaul, 2006; Brinkman, 2009; Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010). While firms
have few incentives to reduce carbon emissions for the world, many climate mitigation projects also create
profitable business opportunities, provided states pay for the incremental cost of reducing negative or pro-
ducing positive externalities. If states decide to invest in carbon abatement, for example, they can leverage
private capital by allowing investors to keep their profits. The value of public investment is increased by the
private investment that follows.
Unfortunately, leveraging private capital for climate mitigation is not easy. If governments cannot credi-
bly commit to regulations and subsidies that turn the supply of climate mitigation into a profitable enterprise,
markets cannot help states (Lin, Ko, and Yeh, 2007; Brinkman, 2009). The problem is exacerbated by the
fact that many of the most lucrative project opportunities are found in politically risky countries (Markusen,
2001; Henisz, 2002; Büthe and Milner, 2008). Many biodiversity hotspots are located in unpredictable
countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose governments cannot credibly commit to pro-
tect foreign investors’ property rights. Investing in renewable energy is similarly difficult in countries that
cannot reliably protect foreign property and technological innovation against theft and violent expropriation.
MacKenzie, Ohndorf, and Palmer (2012) show, for example, that imperfect enforcement of contracts under
the CDM creates a moral hazard problem that precludes efficient levels of investment.
Given these difficulties, the effectiveness of different strategies for leveraging private capital is an im-
portant question for climate mitigation. One key issue in the design of such strategies is the choice between
emphasizing bilateral and unilateral implementation. However, the relative merits of bilateral and unilateral
project implementation are poorly understood. Although there is now a substantial literature on public-
private partnerships and private governance (Gulbrandsen, 2004; Kaul, 2006; Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010;
Büthe and Mattli, 2011), earlier research has not developed explicit models to compare bilateral and unilat-
eral modes of project implementation. In the literature on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the
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difference between bilateral and unilateral implementation is recognized (Dinar et al., 2011; Winkelman and
Moore, 2011; World Bank, 2011). For example, these studies note that the unilateral implementation of miti-
gation projects has become increasingly popular. However, the literature does not examine the consequences
of unilateral implementation for leveraging private capital.
An important exception to this trend is Michaelowa’s (2007) study of unilateral CDM. He emphasizes
two aspects of the problem. First, political risks and transaction costs often deter foreign investors from par-
ticipating directly in project implementation. Therefore, unilateral implementation has become increasingly
popular. Accordingly, Lütken and Michaelowa (2008) show that the importance of unilateral implementa-
tion for the CDM has indeed increased over time. Moreover, unilateral CDM is mostly focused on rapidly
industrializing democratic countries, such as India, while bilateral CDM dominates project implementa-
tion in the least developed countries. This is understandable given that in the least developed countries,
capital markets may not function well and the number of available, competent project developers may be
low. However, Lütken and Michaelowa (2008) do not examine how unilateral implementation influences
the availability of private capital.
In the case of China, Maraseni and Xinquan (2011) provide evidence for the claim that unilateral imple-
mentation reduces political risk and transaction costs for interested investors. However, it remains unclear
whether their findings are valid outside China and whether the advantages of unilateral implementation out-
weigh the costs, including reduced technology transfer and lack of external capacity building. In addition to
illuminating the general trade-off between unilateral implementation and bilateral contracting, the theoreti-
cal model presented in the next section allows us to examine the consequences of unilateral implementation
in the context of the CDM.
3 Private Investment in Climate Mitigation for Carbon Credits
We rely on a simple decision-theoretic model to analyze the possibility of private capital investment in
carbon abatement. In the model, projects produce two different profit streams. First, there are direct profits,
such as reduced energy consumption following efficiency improvements. Second, projects may generate
credits that can be sold on global markets. For example, energy efficiency improvements mitigate climate
change, so they qualify for carbon credits. To evaluate the financial feasibility of the project, we compare
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the total value of these profit streams to the risk of project failure and costs of project implementation.
If implemented, the project is assumed to generate genuine emissions reductions, so that the problem of
non-additionality is ignored.
We examine how much investment can be secured under unilateral and bilateral modes of contracting, as
defined in the introduction. In unilateral implementation, project developers are essentially private investors
who maximize their profits by investing their capital in the local economy. In the CDM, for example,
project developers could be factories in developing countries that invest in energy efficiency measures to
reduce their production costs and gain carbon credits. While these projects face political-economic risks,
they do not suffer from risks associated with foreign direct investment, such as asymmetric information and
discrimination against foreign investors.
In bilateral contracting, a domestic investor in a developing country finds an international partner, and
they collaborate to jointly implement the project. For example, a Chinese factory interested in energy
efficiency could collaborate with a European company that has access to advanced energy conservation
technologies. Alternatively, the Chinese factory could find a European bank that would cover some of the
project’s fixed capital costs and write a contract to gain some proportion of the carbon credits. Political and
other project risks can be expected to be higher because the participation of a foreign investor raises the
possibilities of discrimination against foreign investors and information asymmetries.
We examine if unilateral implementation is more profitable because domestic developers are less vulner-
able to political risk than foreign investors. Building on this insight, we can examine if bilateral contracting
can leverage significant amounts of private capital for climate mitigation. If unilateral implementation is
significantly more profitable, then developing institutions for bilateral contracting is not worthwhile. If uni-
lateral implementation does not hold a significant advantage, then bilateral contracting can expand access to
private capital, thereby increasing climate mitigation.
3.1 Feasibility of Project Investment
Consider a project that requires a total capital cost of c > 0 during the implementation period. For example,
in the case of climate mitigation an increase in c would capture increased marginal abatement costs, perhaps
because the carbon intensity of the economy would decrease. The less carbon an economy emits relative to
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its gross domestic product, the harder it is to find low-cost substitutes for carbon. Thus, the marginal cost
of climate mitigation increases. Similarly, c could contain information about the transaction cost of project
implementation (Michaelowa, 2007). If the project succeeds, it produces a gross profit pi > 0. This profit
captures the total value of the project, the capital cost notwithstanding. For example, it could reflect both
the direct value of a climate mitigation project, such as selling renewable electricity to consumers, and the
value of the resulting carbon credits on global markets.
As we consider the feasibility of project implementation, we assume capital markets exist. This means
that our focus is not on any particular investor’s decision. Rather, we examine whether any of a possibly
large number of investors would be willing to implement the project. This assumption accords with the
principles underscored in the literature on leveraging private capital for climate mitigation. The question is
not if any particular investor is willing to implement a project, but if capital markets can mobilize enough
resources for project implementation.3
The project also carries risks. Let p ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability of project success. For example, the
project could fail if the host country’s regulators decide to prevent implementation. As these risks decrease,
the probability of success p increases. Under this simple framework, the project can be implemented if
capital markets can expect a net profit. This means that the difference between the expected benefit and
project cost must exceed the value of alternative investment opportunities, normalized to zero without loss of
generality. Thus, our model assumes investors are savvy: they consider alternative investment opportunities.
Formally, the following condition determines the financial feasibility of the project:
ppi ≥ c. (1)
In plain English, the expected benefits ppi must exceed the costs c. If this condition is met, the project is
profitable enough that, in equilibrium, an investor for the project is found. In what follows, we characterize
the determinants of the risk parameter p and derive empirical implications from this characterization.4
3Formally, one might assume that a continuum of investors with different preferences exists. Our decision-theoretic model
would examine whether at least one of these investors has an incentive to provide capital for the project.
4For simplicity, investors are assumed to be risk-neutral. In the appendix, we show the results also hold for risk-averse investors.
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3.2 Unilateral and Bilateral Implementation
The main difference between unilateral and bilateral implementation lies in the project’s risk component.
In considering this risk, we hold the environmental integrity of the project constant and examine the ability
of unilateral and bilateral implementation to avoid project risks. In other words, we examine if unilateral
or bilateral implementation can implement projects of a given environmental value more cost-effectively
due to lower risk. For unilateral implementation, foreign beneficiaries of the project purchase credits on
global markets, without being involved in a project. Therefore, the project’s profitability is not influenced
by political-economic risks associated with foreign direct investment. With bilateral implementation, the
project depends on the participation of foreign investors, whose decisions are critical.5
There are several reasons why the participation of foreign partners should be associated with higher
risk. First, the host government has fewer political incentives to help foreign partners generate profits. The
literature on foreign investment often emphasizes political risks, such as discrimination and expropriation
(Jensen, 2003). Even though flagrant forms of investment discrimination, such as nationalization, have
decreased over time, concerns about the investment environment remain a major obstacle to increased in-
vestment (Henisz, 2002; Büthe and Milner, 2008; Kerner, 2009). Since the government is not politically
accountable to foreign partners, it may be tempted to extract more rents from foreign partners than from
domestic developers, which can more directly influence the government’s political fortunes.6
Second, the presence of a foreign partner may create problems of asymmetric information. Specifically,
the domestic project developer may have an informational advantage over the foreign partner regarding the
risks and profitability of the project (MacKenzie, Ohndorf, and Palmer, 2012). Since the foreign partner
may not have enough information about the local context due to a lack of experience, its actions may not
be based on accurate information about host country conditions (Tallman, 1992). In this case, the foreign
5Unilateral and bilateral implementation assign a different role to foreign investors: passive in unilateral, active in bilateral.
Therefore, we cannot compare a specific investor’s choice across unilateral and bilateral implementation. However, we can compare
the availability of private capital in the aggregate. An individual investor’s decision is not as important as the capital market’s
aggregate ability to supply capital for project implementation. Conceptually, this is identical to the basic microeconomic analysis
of aggregate demand and supply in standard goods markets.
6The size of this effect may depend on the political-economic clout of the foreign partner. Large multinational corporations
may, by virtue of their resources, be able to resist discrimination by the host country’s government. However, this is ultimately an
empirical argument. Unless the foreign partners hold a drastic advantage in terms of their resources, domestic developers should
have an advantage on the margin. The size of this advantage is again an empirical question that cannot be resolved on a theoretical
basis, and our empirical findings suggest that the domestic developers’ advantage is indeed large.
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partner may hesitate to invest without additional and costly information revelation by the partnering local
host. This increases the total negotiation cost and thus contributes to project risk.7
Finally, bilateral implementation may create bargaining problems. While unilateral projects are imple-
mented by a single project developer, who at most has to negotiate with domestic players, bilateral projects
require negotiations between the domestic project developer and a foreign partner. These negotiations may
be delayed, or even fail, if one of the partners decides to “hold out” in view of securing greater concessions
from the other (Williamson, 1979).
To complete the discussion, it is important to consider counterarguments. There are some seemingly
plausible reasons to believe foreign partners may simply have an advantage in finding inexpensive projects
that carry low risks. One is their ability to search profitable carbon abatement opportunities across different
host countries. In practice, this advantage is probably small. Given the high transaction cost of negotiating a
partnership with a local developer, it is difficult for a foreign partner to threaten to move to another country in
the negotiations. Moreover, the local developer can also simply threaten to collaborate with another foreign
partner. Another possibility is that the foreign investor can secure capital more easily than the domestic
developer due to a better reputation. We expect this benefit to be relatively limited, given that the foreign
investor will have to work with a domestic developer in any case.
Due to the higher political risk that accompanies bilateral project implementation, we assume that the
ex ante probability of success for unilateral projects, pu ∈ (0, 1), is higher than the probability of success
for bilateral projects, pb ∈ (0, 1). Formally, we assume pu > pb. Empirically, this assumption does not
mean that a given unilateral project is always less risky than a given bilateral project. Projects are highly
heterogeneous and the risks associated with them vary widely, regardless of the mode of implementation.
We, however, expect the unilateral-bilateral difference to be important on the margin.
By focusing on political-economic risks, which favor unilateral implementation, we can identify the
relative advantage of unilateral over bilateral implementation. If this advantage is large, then states should
invest in creating international institutions that promote unilateral project implementation, such as carbon
markets. If the advantage is small, then institutions for bilateral implementation are optimal. After all, bilat-
eral implementation also has benefits, such as increased technology transfer (Bayer and Urpelainen, 2013)
7To be sure, it is possible that bilateral implementation allows domestic developers to capitalize on foreign expertise. However,
this expertise would simply create another problem of asymmetric information, further complicating bargaining.
10
and the possibility of external capacity building. While our model does not emphasize these benefits, their
presence is important because otherwise unilateral implementation would dominate bilateral implementation
by definition.8
3.3 Testable Implications
Our two-part hypothesis from the model is that unilateral project implementation has a particularly large
advantage vis-à-vis bilateral contracting if project costs c are high. To derive this hypothesis, note that slight
manipulation of equation (1) gives
pi ≥ c
p
. (2)
Intuitively, this expression shows the “investment threshold” for pi, defined as the lowest total value of the
project’s benefits pi that allows profitable investment. Whenever pi exceeds the ratio of project cost to the
success probability, cp , capital markets invest in the project. Higher probabilities of project success p make
investment more likely, ceteris paribus. At the same time, the size of the marginal effect of an increase in
a project’s success probability is increasing in project costs c. Formally, the marginal effect of changes in p
on the lowest value of pi that allows investment is − c
p2
. The absolute value of this effect is increasing in c.
Given that probabilities for successful unilateral contracting pu are higher than those for bilateral con-
tracting pb, the interactive effect of p and c has two important implications. First, the marginal effect of
moving from bilateral implementation, with a relatively low success probability pb, to unilateral implemen-
tation, with a higher success probability pu, has a larger effect on the attractiveness of investment when
project costs c are sufficiently high. For expensive projects, unilateral implementation draws significantly
more private capital than bilateral implementation. However, the comparative advantage of unilateral con-
tracting over bilateral contracting decreases as project costs c decrease. This also follows directly from the
fact that the size of the negative marginal effect of increasing p on the investment threshold is decreasing in
c. Intuitively, if project costs are low, capital markets are not as sensitive to changes in success probabilities
p as when costs are high. This allows us to derive our two-part hypothesis:
8To be sure, bilateral contracting may also mitigate against one type of project risk. If a contract is formed, the local project
developer may not have to worry about price risk. Our theory is based on the assumption that more fundamental project risks,
such as implementation failure, are more important than price risk. Moreover, bilateral contracting on price may be difficult if the
foreign partner believes that the local project developer holds private information.
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Hypothesis 1. If the cost of project implementation c is high, unilateral implementation draws significantly
more private capital than bilateral contracting. As the cost of project implementation c decreases, the
advantage of unilateral implementation over bilateral contracting in drawing private capital decreases.
The logic behind our hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1. For a given success probability of bilateral
implementation pb, the figure shows how much the investment threshold for pi decreases for different project
costs c if unilateral implementation is used instead of bilateral implementation. Lower values suggest large
advantages of unilateral implementation over bilateral implementation. As the figure shows, the advantage
of unilateral implementation increases with project costs c. Given high project costs, the reduced political-
economic risk from unilateral implementation is highly valuable for leveraging climate capital.
[Figure 1 about here.]
4 Research Design
Testing our theory requires data on climate mitigation projects implemented by project developers. In par-
ticular, we need detailed data on how much private capital was made available for a project of a given size.
Additionally, the data must exhibit variation in the mode of contracting while holding other contextual fac-
tors constant. In view of these requirements, the CDM presents an ideal opportunity.9 The purpose of the
CDM is to reduce the cost of climate mitigation in industrialized countries by allowing them to substitute
“carbon credits” for costly domestic mitigation. Credits are acquired from climate mitigation projects in
developing countries, where the cost of pollution abatement is often lower than in industrialized countries.
Since the CDM allows both unilateral and bilateral implementation, it allows us to test our theoretical
argument within one context. Initially, the CDM only allowed bilateral implementation. Aware of the poten-
tial value of carbon credits, a number of developing countries suggested they should be allowed under the
CDM to finance project implementation within their own borders, earning emission credits even without the
presence of Annex B investment. While the legality of such unilateral implementation was initially unset-
tled under the CDM, in 2005 the Executive Board of the CDM adopted a resolution specifically permitting
unilateral implementation (Michaelowa, 2007).10
9See http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html for the CDM. Accessed January 19, 2012.
10For details of CDM project implementation, see our appendix.
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Project data are provided by the CDM/JI Pipeline Database maintained by the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme.11 Our dataset covers 3,749 projects that were registered, waiting for registration, or at
the validation stage between 2003 and 2011. While most projects are located in China (1,939) and India
(823), Brazil and Malaysia also host more than 100 projects each.12 For each project, variables are coded
consistently provided at the time of registration.13 In total, our sample includes 55 different countries in all
regions of the world.14
4.1 Dependent Variable
We examine how much private capital investors are willing to supply under bilateral and unilateral contract-
ing. Accordingly, the dependent variable is the amount of private capital invested for each ton of mitigated
carbon dioxide. By a ton of mitigated carbon dioxide, we refer to expected emissions reductions in tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent relative to the additionality baseline by the year 2020, as defined in the database.
The data are based on the project design documents and refer to expected total investment during the project.
This variable can be thought of as a proxy for investors’ willingness to pay for carbon abatement, relative to
the size of the project. Previous research has focused on the geographic distribution of projects (Dinar et al.,
2011), and thus does not shed light on investors’ willingness to invest. It remains unclear whether and how
the mode of contracting influences investors’ willingness to pay for carbon abatement in individual projects.
Therefore, it is useful to examine investment behavior with single projects as the unit of analysis.15
Of course, the resulting ratio of investment to carbon abatement is higher than the marginal carbon
abatement cost. CDM projects generate many other benefits than carbon credits, and investors consider
these in their decisions to allocate capital. Indeed, our data clearly show that the investment per ton of
carbon dioxide is much higher than the marginal abatement cost, often by a magnitude. This is as expected,
given the direct profits from CDM projects, such as sales of renewable electricity.
11See http://cdmpipeline.org. Accessed January 19, 2012.
12For a list of the top 10 CDM host countries, see our appendix.
13Here, we include terminated and rejected projects. Below, we also analyze a sample excluding these projects.
14Regionally: Asia and Pacific (3,206 projects), Latin America (422 projects), Africa (76 projects), Europe and Central Asia (17
projects), and the Middle-East (28 projects).
15In the appendix, we show that our results are also reasonably robust when aggregating data to the country level and estimating
cross-sectional OLS models. This is particularly true when we re-weight each country’s variance with the inverse of CDM project
counts.
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Since our dataset includes both the amount of carbon avoided by a particular project and the total invest-
ment, we can construct our dependent variable as a ratio of the two. The data are not normally distributed,
so we logarithmize the dependent variable. Given this logarithmization, the distribution is approximately
normal, as shown in the appendix. However, some outliers remain. We exclude these from our analyses in
a robustness check provided in the appendix.
4.2 Independent Variables: Contracting Mode and Marginal Abatement Cost
We examine the interactive effect of two independent variables. Our primary interest lies in the effect of
contracting strategy on the supply of private capital for a project at different marginal abatement costs, as
shown in the above hypothesis. Since we do not expect unilateral implementation to have an advantage at
low marginal abatement costs, an interaction term must be included in all regressions. We are interested
in the unilateral-bilateral difference at various levels of marginal abatement costs, and only a product term
allows us to evaluate such conditional effects.
The CDM database indicates whether a project was implemented unilaterally or based on a formal
emission reduction purchase agreement (ERPA) with a foreign partner. These partners are mostly financial
institutions and large corporations; for them a purchase agreement is essentially a commitment to pay for
project implementation. As Michaelowa (2007, 21) puts it, “[w]ith the conclusion of an ERPA the buyer
commits to purchasing a certain amount of future CERs [Certified Emission Reductions] at a specific price”
and that “the ERPA assigns the price risk and the Kyoto risk to the [...] buyer.”
Following previous research (Michaelowa, 2007; Dinar et al., 2011), all projects with an ERPA by the
project’s validation date are considered bilateral. All other projects are considered unilateral. Ideally, we
would also include data on the existence of an ERPA at registration or later, but such data are not available.16
We recognize that this coding is imperfect: an ERPA may contain a shallow commitment by the foreign
partner, and a project without an ERPA may feature foreign involvement. As Michaelowa (2007) notes,
no unambiguous definition of a unilateral project is possible: foreign participation has myriad forms and
degrees. In addition to capturing an important form of project risk, our definition has the major advantage
16This coding cannot handle the possibility that an ERPA is formed later, such as upon registration. Such data are not available
because the CDM database does not monitor individual projects continuously. However, even in cases of a late ERPA, the project
developers did not have a purchase agreement at the time they submitted the project for registration.
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of being objective and available for all CDM projects. Data for more nuanced distinctions require subjective
coding and are not available for the entire sample.
CDM project number 2175 (“24MW Perla Mini Hydel Project, Karnataka, India”) exemplifies unilat-
eral implementation.17 The purpose of this project was to promote clean energy production through the
creation of a hydroelectric generator in the Netravathi river in India, with annual expected carbon reduc-
tions of 59,299 tons over ten years. The electricity would then be sold to a state government-owned utility
company. In this case, the investor that stands to earn these CERs for this project is a domestic firm: AMR
Power Private, Ltd, of Hyderabad, India. For this large-scale hydroelectricity project, aggregate investment
totals Rs 971 million (about US$ 16 million)18, which will be used to cover construction costs involving the
payment of wages, construction materials, and construction equipment on site; electro mechanical equip-
ment is estimated to cost about Rs 480 million (about US$ 8 million). Funding for this investment comes
from equity and term loans, to be fully paid back during the first ten years of operation.
Now consider CDM project number 4852 (“Rakchad Small Hydro Electric Project”), which is similar to
the above project in many respects and involves the financing of a small-scale hydroelectric power project to
benefit a public utility, the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board.19 It comes with a capital cost of about
Rs 310 million (about US$ 5 million), 30% of which are financed by equity shares and 70% by a term loan
with 13% interest rate. However, unlike the project in Karnatka, the project in Rakchad is jointly run by
Regent Energy, Ltd, as the Indian host, and Agrienergy, Ltd, of the United Kingdom as the foreign partner,
both of which are registered as project partners on equal terms. For this project with its estimated annual
carbon reductions of 22,605 tons of CO2 equivalents, over a seven-year crediting period, foreign investment
and consultancy services originate from an Annex B country; therefore, this latter hydro project exemplifies
bilateral implementation.
Clearly, the choice between unilateral and bilateral project implementation is endogenous to some extent,
so that selection effects have to be considered. Importantly, our formal model can account for this: the
empirical expectations coming from the decision-theoretic model are valid even though investors behave
17See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1218551904.34/view for detailed project documenta-
tion. Accessed July 8, 2013.
18We used a 60.96 rupees per US dollar exchange rate, dating from July 8, 2013.
19See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1254893204.97/view for detailed project documenta-
tion. Accessed July 8, 2013.
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strategically. Since our theory accounts for this type of endogeneity, reverse causality from strategic behavior
does not threaten the validity of our hypothesis test.20
Moreover, it is clear that global competition for cost-effectiveness characterizes both unilateral and bi-
lateral implementation. In bilateral implementation, competition occurs between project developers looking
for foreign partners. In unilateral implementation, carbon credits are sold in highly competitive markets. In
this regard, there is no difference between the two modes of implementation.
China also deserves special mention. In China, almost all projects are formally bilateral due to legisla-
tion that requires an ERPA. In practice, however, many Chinese projects are essentially unilateral. To our
understanding, no such legislation exists in any other country. In the appendix, we replicate our analysis
excluding China, and show that this unique case does not drive our results.
To illustrate the effect of contracting mode on our dependent variable, Figure 2 shows the annual mean
of project investments for unilateral and bilateral projects separately. Unilateral projects draw much larger
amounts of private capital. This could be for various reasons, including project type and contracting risk. For
the 967 unilateral projects in our sample, the overall mean investment is US$ 660 per ton of carbon dioxide,
while the mean investment in the 2,782 bilateral projects is only US$ 335 per ton of carbon dioxide. These
numbers differ from marginal abatement costs by an order of magnitude, suggesting that investment is not a
proxy for marginal abatement cost. This is consistent with the notion that CDM projects also produce other
types of profits.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Our second independent variable is intended to capture the marginal abatement cost in a host country
at a given time. Marginal abatement costs are associated with the reduction of an additional unit of car-
bon emissions given current abatement levels. This implies that marginal abatement costs depend on the
opportunities to reduce carbon.
We measure a country’s marginal abatement costs using the national economy’s carbon intensity. Since
carbon intensity is defined as the ratio of carbon emissions to aggregate economic output, it captures the
idea that the cost of abatement increases as carbon emitted for each unit of economic output decreases. If an
20Of course, this does not mean that there could not be other causes of endogeneity. We have selected our specifications and
robustness tests to guard against this possibility, in particular by avoiding potentially endogenous regressors.
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economy is already characterized by low carbon intensity, reducing emissions requires major investments
in new production technologies. This is more costly than reducing high emissions resulting from wasteful
energy production or use. That is why it is costlier to reduce CO2 emissions in Sweden or Japan, which
rank among the least carbon intensive industrialized economies, than in China or India. It would clearly be
better to have disaggregated data on marginal costs by project, but this is not possible for a global dataset
with thousands of projects. Even at the national level, marginal abatement cost curves are not available for
most countries in our sample. For example, Castro’s (2012) recent analysis of marginal abatement costs
only focuses on eight countries due to data limitations. We cannot conduct our analysis with such a small
sample. Besides problems of data availability, Kuik, Brander, and Tol (2009) show that estimates of marginal
abatement cost curves are generally very sensitive to modeling assumptions and come with extremely large
confidence bounds around the mean estimate, clearly falling below conventional standards of good practice
in econometrically sound data analysis.
Abatement costs vary significantly across project types (Castro, 2012), and different types of projects
feature different levels of risk (Balatbat, Findlay, and Carmichael, 2012). For example, solar power is mostly
more expensive than hydroelectricity. Projects to combat deforestation may be more complex and produce
less predictable results than renewable energy generation. We control for these effects by including fixed
effects for project type. In one of the robustness checks, we even include detailed type fixed effects for
23 separate categories.
We divide carbon dioxide emissions, measured in millions of tons, by gross domestic product, measured
in constant U.S. dollars with 2000 prices. We also use a three-year moving average to avoid conflating
structural factors and random variation across time. We lag carbon intensity by two years because we only
have carbon intensity data up to year 2009 and many CDM projects were implemented in 2011. This helps
us avoid losing a large number of observations. Additionally, carbon intensity varies much more across
countries than over time, so time lags and moving averages are appropriate. For example, the value of this
independent variable would be the mean of the years (t − 3), (t − 2), (t − 1) for a project implemented at
time t.
Our cost measure may suffer from two problems. First, investment per ton of carbon dioxide is obviously
related to the size of the project. In addition to controlling for the size classification of projects in the main
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analysis, the appendix reports additional models that include an interaction between implementation mode
and the expected carbon abatement from the project. The results clearly show that our finding is not driven
by size bias. Another potential issue concerns project types. While controlling for project type in our main
analysis, we replicated our findings for hydroelectricity projects (1,232 projects in the full sample) as the
largest category, excluding all other projects, and found that our results remained unchanged. This suggests
that our results are not driven by bias from heterogeneous effects across project types.21
4.3 Control Variables
The availability of private capital for project implementation depends on a variety of factors other than the
mode of contracting and marginal abatement costs. While we use a parsimonious, theoretically informed
set of control variables in our main model, we provide additional robustness tests, including additional
covariates, in the appendix. Our main model incorporates three different control variables: corruption,
regime type, and GDP.
To account for a country’s quality of governance, we include a measure of government corruption from
the International Country Risk Guide. We do so to control for the possibility that weak government in-
stitutions may inhibit investment in projects.22 In the context of CDM, where project risks are generally
high, investors consider the institutional environment of target countries. Higher values on the corruption
measure indicate more corruption. In our dataset, countries such as Singapore or Chile are classified as
low corruption countries, while countries such as Guatemala or Nigeria are classified as states with high
corruption levels. Again, we use a three-year moving average lagged by two years to avoid losing the years
2010-2011. For a project implemented at time t, the value of the control variable is the mean for the years
(t− 3), (t− 2), (t− 1).
We also include a lagged binary indicator for regime type (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010).
Democratic countries have stronger incentives to supply environmental public goods to their constituencies
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Accordingly, they may be more willing than non-democracies to support
21For the second and third largest renewable project types, wind (801 projects in the full sample) and biomass (377 projects in the
full sample), we do not find evidence for our hypothesis. This probably reflects the reduction of the sample size to about 20 percent
and 10 percent of the original dataset for wind and biomass projects, respectively. Our results do hold, however, if we exclude wind
and biomass projects from our main analysis.
22See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx. Accessed January 19, 2012.
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private investment in climate mitigation projects. After all, many climate mitigation projects produce local
environmental and economic benefits as well.
Our third control variable is the logarithm of a country’s GDP. Wealthy countries may afford more
capital for climate mitigation, but it could also be that wealthy countries offer more profitable alternatives
for investment. Thus, the opportunity costs to invest into carbon reduction projects may be too high in
relatively wealthy countries. In our sample, this issue is critical because many of the wealthier countries are
newly industrialized states. Whether GDP has a positive or a negative effect on investment behavior depends
on a country’s level of development. Even though we do not have a clear expectation for this variable, it
is important to control for GDP in our analyses. For consistency, we again include GDP as a three-year
moving average with a two-year lag.23
To these controls, we add two sets of fixed effects. First, we aggregated projects into nine major cat-
egories, following the codes provided in the CDM Pipeline guidance document.24 We distinguish projects
that target renewable energies (2,444 projects), the coal and cement sector (630 projects), energy efficiency
on the supply (434 projects) and demand side (90 projects), fuel switching (91 projects), HFC and N20
reductions (38 projects), reforestation (11 projects), transport (10 projects), and CO2 usage (1 project).
Controlling for project type is important because different project types require substantially different capi-
tal investments. While carbon emissions can be reduced relatively cheaply in projects with low capital input,
e.g., reforestation, setting up a wind farm or installing a large hydroelectricity dam requires a lot of private
capital. Failure to control for project type might lead one to wrongly attribute differences in our dependent
variable to other variables. In the appendix, we show that the results hold even if we use a more refined
classification with 23 categories.
Second, we include year fixed effects in all models. The lucrativeness of projects depends on the size and
prospects of the global carbon market, and these have varied dramatically over the period of investigation.
The World Bank’s 2011 report on the “State and Trends of the Carbon Market” shows that the value of assets
traded in the primary CDM market tripled from US$ 2.6 billion in 2005 to US$ 7.4 billion in 2007, only to
23In a robustness check, we also include the square of GDP to account for the environmental Kuznets curve. Results are un-
changed.
24These are given in Table 11 of the “Analysis” tab in the CDM Pipeline spreadsheet that can be downloaded from the UNEP
website. See http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm. Accessed February 9, 2012.
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see a rapid decline in the following years (World Bank, 2011, 9). These changes in the global market for
carbon credits underscore the need for year effects in our model specification.
In the appendix, we present summary statistics for our main variables and controls. The first subtable
shows them for the full sample, while the two other subtables present them separately for unilateral and
bilateral projects. One notable difference between unilateral and bilateral projects is that the former are
more common in democracies and countries with low carbon intensities. This may reflect differences in
autocratic and democratic economic freedom. The latter observation is consistent with our argument: uni-
lateral projects should have a significant advantage in countries with generally low carbon intensity, because
in these countries project implementation is relatively costly. The flip side of this is that foreign capital is
allocated into more risky bilateral projects only if higher risks are compensated with lower project costs.
This is reflected in higher average carbon intensities and, by our argument, in lower marginal abatement
costs in host countries for bilateral CDM projects.
We also present correlation matrices for these samples in the appendix. Notably, our dependent variable
is positively and significantly correlated with carbon intensity. This is as expected, because high carbon
intensities create profitable opportunities for mitigation. Our dependent variable is also positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with the indicator for a unilateral project. This is as expected because domestic project
developers have an information advantage and can better assess project risks that result from political, cul-
tural, and social determinants. This may imply that domestic developers assign higher success probabilities
to specific projects compared to their foreign counterparts. They invest more in the same projects as they
face lower uncertainty. This relationship is revealed in the positive correlation coefficient between unilateral
contracting and investments per ton of carbon dioxide.
4.4 Matching on Contract Type
To enhance the reliability of our empirical analysis and to avoid bias due to nonlinear effects, we implement a
matching analysis (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). Specifically, our matching technique is designed to ensure
covariate balance between unilateral and bilateral projects. As our correlation matrix from the appendix
shows, the contracting mode variable is not randomly assigned. For example, it is highly correlated with
democracy and corruption. This can pose a problem for our analysis if the effect of contracting mode on our
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dependent variable is nonlinear: merely controlling for covariates would be insufficient to disentangle the
“treatment” effect (Morgan and Winship, 2010). Matching allows us to pre-process the data in such a fashion
that unilateral and bilateral projects are comparable, while observations without a match are discarded. As
shown in the appendix, matching greatly reduces the covariate imbalance in our sample, yet the results
continue to hold.
5 Findings
We first discuss the primary findings from the statistical analysis and substantive effects. Next, we examine
the robustness of our findings.
5.1 Main Results
Our main results are presented in Table 1. The first two models include our full sample. Model (1) presents
the results for our main independent variables only, while model (2) also adds corruption, the binary regime
type indicator, and GDP. Models (3) and (4) follow the same pattern, excluding China from our sample.
Models (5) and (6) exclude India.25 All models are estimated with year fixed effects and project fixed effects
to account for temporal changes in global carbon markets and systematic project heterogeneity, respectively.
All standard errors are clustered by country.
[Table 1 about here.]
We hypothesize that the comparative advantage of unilateral projects in acquiring private capital is great-
est when costs for project implementation are high. As we argued above, project implementation is expen-
sive in host countries with low carbon intensities. Therefore, we can read the strong positive effect of our
unilateral dummy on investments per ton of CO2 as supporting our hypothesis. This effect is highly signif-
icant and consistently so for all our model specifications. It also survives severe reductions of sample size
when we exclude Chinese and Indian projects.
25In the appendix, we estimate the main model while excluding CDM projects from both China and India. Our results are not
affected.
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The negative and persistently significant interaction effect of the dummy for unilateral projects and CO2
intensity provide evidence for the second part of our hypothesis. Unilateral projects attract high levels of pri-
vate funds when project costs are high, but as costs decline, i.e., as carbon intensity increases, this vanishes.
The relationship depicted in Figure 1 above can be seen in the interaction term’s negative coefficient.
Regarding controls, it is interesting that both corruption and democracy do not seem to matter for in-
vestment choice. Intuitively appealing claims that democratic countries benefit from larger capital inflows
due to higher political reliability, or that corrupt governments suffer from capital flight are not corroborated.
For GDP, we find a significant negative effect; it seems that wealthier countries in our sample can offer more
attractive investment possibilities than carbon abatement projects. Therefore, investments per ton of carbon
dioxide are lower in richer countries than in poorer ones.
We show the marginal effect of unilateralism on investment, conditional on the host country’s carbon
intensity in Figure 3.26 We present our results for the entire sample of 3,749 projects, as well as for the
subsamples excluding China and India. Figure 3 clearly indicates that the negative interaction effect is not
driven by one single country, but is a pattern that is consistently found across subsamples.
[Figure 3 about here.]
These plots demonstrate that the negative interaction effect translates into a substantively meaningful
effect. The marginal effect of unilateralism is strictly positive for low carbon intensities in all three sub-
samples, yet it is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero for logarithmized carbon intensities larger
than two. Moreover, sufficient data mass exists for carbon intensities beyond two.
5.2 Robustness: Additional Interactions
We estimated four additional variants of our main model, differentiated only by an additional interaction
term between unilateral implementation and, alternately, corruption, democracy, GDP, and project size (us-
ing different measures). Most importantly, the interaction between unilateral implementation and carbon
intensity is robust across these models. While statistical significance levels vary somewhat, the signs on the
interaction between unilateral implementation and carbon intensity are consistently negative.
26The simulations were implemented using Fred Boehmke’s grinter program in Stata.
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First, we considered the interactive effect of unilateral implementation and corruption. We found some
evidence of an interaction in the full sample, though the sign was unexpected: as corruption increases, the
advantage of unilateral implementation decreases. This seems to indicate that domestic project developers
suffer more from corruption if they do not cooperate with foreign investors. Further research is warranted,
though we caution that the confidence intervals around the estimates are rather wide.
We also considered the effect of unilateral implementation in democracies versus autocracies. We found
no interactive effect whatsoever: the sign of the interaction term flips between models and the term itself is
never significant. Democratic governance does not appear to condition the difference between contracting
modes.
Third, we found that GDP strongly influences the effect of unilateral implementation for four out of six
models. Specifically, the effect of unilateral implementation on the supply of private capital is maximized
in rich countries. This suggests that shortages of foreign investments in rather wealthy countries are com-
pensated for by unilateral project implementation through domestic project developers. In these countries
domestic actors seem to set up projects to sell climate mitigation credits in global carbon markets or to bank
them for future use.
Finally, we examined the interactive effect of project size on the unilateral implementation advantage.
We find no support for a conditional effect of project size. The interaction effect for the small projects
dummy and unilateral implementation is nowhere close to statistical significance.
5.3 Robustness: Matching and Outlier Analyses
The matching analysis that we conducted to minimize covariate imbalance between unilateral and bilateral
projects also supports our hypothesis. As the appendix shows, unilateral implementation attracts more
private capital in countries with low carbon intensities.
Our results are not driven by outliers either. First, we calculated Cook’s distance for our main model
and eliminated all data points from our dataset with a distance larger than 4/n (Bollen and Jackman, 1990).
Second, we reestimated our models while excluding data that has studentized residuals with an absolute
value greater than two (Ruppert, 2004). This robustness check lends further credibility to our findings.
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5.4 Robustness: Subsets and Additional Controls
We also considered a variety of other robustness tests. First, we excluded the subset of projects that were
ultimately canceled or suspended. Focusing only on successful projects, our results remain virtually un-
changed. The coefficients change slightly, but the substantive magnitude of these changes is small and the
confidence intervals are not much wider. Similarly, we excluded hydroelectricity, wind, biomass, and so-
lar projects, respectively, due to their varying marginal costs. Additionally, we excluded projects focusing
on industrial gases, such as HFC and N2O, methane avoidance, and energy efficiency improvements. The
results were unchanged.
We also replicated our findings for hydroelectricity, biomass, and wind projects, respectively, so that all
other project categories were excluded. The findings are strong for the largest category, hydroelectricity.
The results are weak for the other two types, but this may reflect the fact that the sample size decreases to 20
(wind) or 10 (biomass) percent of the sample. Moreover, we also re-estimated our models for subsamples
of only methane avoidance and energy efficiency improvement projects, without any change to our main
findings despite massive reductions in sample size to about 8.5 and 14 percent, respectively. This suggests
that our results hold even across multiple project-type specific subsamples.
To check the sensitivity of our results to particular regions, we not only jointly exclude projects from
China and India, but also re-estimate our main models while excluding each of the five regions one-by-one.
Our results continue to hold even though in some samples, sample size reduces to less than 15 percent of
the data from the original dataset.
Finally, we complement our model with additional control variables. In addition to more detailed project
type fixed effects with 23 categories, we account for three year moving averages of a country’s population
and investment profile as well as trade, industrial output, and foreign direct investment as shares of GDP. We
include number of internet users as a proxy for a country’s technological advancement. Further, we add gross
domestic savings and real interest rates to account for the importance of available domestic capital. Our main
results are also robust to these changes. With respect to the additional controls, we find no evidence for trade,
inward FDI, industry output, or real interest rates. GDP has a consistently negative effect, suggesting that
wealthier countries may offer more lucrative investment opportunities than carbon abatement. Our results
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provide preliminary evidence that higher domestic savings positively affect investment levels and indicate
strongly positive effects for corruption and internet usage on investments per ton of CO2.
6 Conclusion
This article has investigated the role of institutional design in drawing private capital to climate mitigation
under the CDM. We examined how the availability of private capital depends on the mode of contracting that
international institutions promote. We found that unilateral project implementation can increase the supply
of private capital if the cost of carbon abatement is high. This means that states should only complement
unilateral implementation with bilateral contracts when the cost of climate mitigation is low. Somewhat
disappointingly, foreign investors cannot enhance the supply of private capital in contexts where the demand
for resources per a ton of carbon dioxide is high.
The article also has an important policy implication: unilateral implementation should remain a central
element of the scheme. Initially, the CDM was designed in view of bilateral contracting. However, unilateral
implementation has become increasingly popular (Michaelowa, 2007). Our study shows that unilateral
implementation is particularly important in countries where the marginal cost of pollution abatement is
relatively high. However, the results also caution against excessive optimism. In the most lucrative contexts,
unilateral implementation does not significantly increase capital investment relative to the traditional mode
of bilateral contracting. These lessons should also be applied to the wide variety of other carbon markets
that are currently emerging (World Bank, 2011). Our findings show that their designers should account
for investment incentives and political risks in market design. Of particular importance are the interactive
effects of the contracting mode and country characteristics. This finding suggests that flexible markets that
allow investors to select among multiple contractual models may enhance the efficiency of carbon markets.
The uncertainty regarding the future of the Kyoto Protocol presents a clear danger to the present form
of the CDM (Palmer, 2011). While our model cannot speak to this issue, the findings are also applicable to
a future carbon credit scheme as long as project implementation is somehow rewarded. Even if developing
countries will be rewarded for programs or schemes, they must somehow incentivize foreign and/or domestic
project developers, and our model provides some insight into how this can be done. Moreover, we find it
improbable that the entire CDM architecture would be dismantled. Even if carbon markets based on Kyoto
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commitments were no longer viable, transaction cost economics suggests that states should retain the most
successful features of the CDM and exploit the lessons learned. For these reasons, we believe our model to
have relevance in the post-2012 era of climate policy, too.
We have not commented on the imperfect enforcement of international agreements (Axelrod and Keo-
hane, 1985; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996; Urpelainen, 2010) in the analysis. One key challenge to
applying our model is the difficulty of enforcing international rules under anarchy. The CDM, for example,
depends on there being enough demand for carbon credits. The demand for credits is uncertain, however,
because the Kyoto commitments themselves are not directly enforceable and depend on expectations about
the future viability of the treaty architecture (Palmer, 2011). Our model assumes private investors believe
the enforceability of their contracts. So far, carbon markets have achieved this goal because industrialized
countries have credibly committed to emissions reductions, but past performance is not a guarantee of fu-
ture success. According to the international relations literature, the enforceability of a carbon credit scheme
depends on robust political support among major powers, regardless of exact institutional design (Steinberg,
2002; Victor, 2011). At the same time, if institutional design increases the cost-effectiveness of carbon mar-
kets and creates profitable opportunities for investors, this could bolster domestic political support for the
scheme in key countries.
This article also contributes to the study of public-private partnerships in global governance (Bernhagen
and Mitchell, 2010; Kaul, 2006). In capitalist societies, markets provide most private goods. However, they
are also increasingly important in the provision of public goods, such as climate mitigation. For scholars of
international cooperation interested in understanding the role of private capital, new theories and empirical
evidence are indispensable. This article develops a theory of the relationship between private capital and
climate mitigation. Moreover, it provides systematic empirical evidence in support of the argument.
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Figure 1: The y-axis shows how much the investment threshold for profits pi decreases if unilateral imple-
mentation replaces bilateral contracting. More negative values suggest larger advantages of unilateral over
bilateral implementation. The success probability for bilateral contracting is held constant at pb = 0.25,
but the success probability of unilateral contracting varies: pu = 0.9 for the dashed line, pu = 0.6 for the
solid line, and pu = 0.3 for the dotted line. As the project cost c increases, the decrease in the investment
threshold also becomes larger.
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Figure 2: Annual mean of investment (USD/tCO2) by contracting mode.
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Figure 3: Marginal effects. The top graph shows the full sample, the middle graph the sample without China,
and the bottom graph the sample without India. The straight line shows the estimated difference between
unilateral and bilateral implementation on investment per ton of carbon dioxide emissions. The dashed lines
are 95% confidence intervals. 32
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model Model Model Model Model Model
Unilateral 0.82∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22)
CO2 Intensity (3yr moving) 0.08 0.16 0.26∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.05 0.08
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11)
Unilateral x CO2 Intensity -0.22∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08)
Corruption (3yr moving) 0.17 0.11 0.16
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Democracy 0.09 0.01 -0.04
(0.10) (0.17) (0.20)
GDP (3yr moving, log) -0.07 -0.04 -0.07
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Constant 3.54∗∗∗ 4.84∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗ 3.46∗∗∗ 4.80∗∗∗
(0.21) (1.23) (0.18) (1.66) (0.27) (1.23)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3749 3749 1810 1810 2926 2926
R2 0.503 0.508 0.535 0.536 0.546 0.551
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Investment/tCO2
Models (3-4) exclude China. Models (5-6) exclude India
All models: Robust SEs clustered by country
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1: Main results. Our two-part hypothesis states that the coefficient on “Unilateral” should be positive
and statistically significant, while the coefficient on “Unilateral x CO2 Intensity” should be negative and
statistically significant.
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